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The Need for Religious Groups to Be Exempt from 
the Diversity Policies of Universities in Light of 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez 
INTRODUCTION 
“This is an environment of welcoming, so you should just get 
the hell out.”1 
The irony of the above statement is obvious. It is a tragedy, 
then, that the humor appears to have been lost on the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Now, a state law school’s policy that, 
under the guise of welcoming all comers, has told religious groups 
to effectively “get the hell out” has been given constitutional 
blessing.2  
The case arose when a group of Christian students sought 
recognition at the University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law (Hastings).3 The group they wished to organize, the Christian 
Legal Society (CLS), would require all members and officers to 
affirm certain tenets of the Christian faith, as well as abstain from 
sexual conduct outside of marriage.4 This requirement meant that 
all homosexual activity was prohibited for CLS members and 
officers.5 Hastings, finding that these requirements violated its 
policy prohibiting students from discriminating on any basis, 
denied the group recognition.6 The CLS sued Hastings, arguing 
that the denial impaired the constitutional rights of the students to 
free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion.7 
By a 5–4 majority, the Court ruled in favor of Hastings, finding 
that the “all-comers” policy Hastings had in place was content-
neutral and that the burdens on students resulting from the need to 
organize without official school recognition were not overly 
burdensome.8  
Although it is debatable how far-reaching the effects of this 
decision will be, the Court’s reasoning puts many collegiate 
religious groups in jeopardy of being denied recognition by their 
universities. By placing religious groups in such a position, the 
Supreme Court has unwisely endangered the nature of a university 
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 1. The Office: Diversity Day (NBC television broadcast Mar. 29, 2005).  
 2. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010). 
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 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 2981. 
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 8. Id.  




as a marketplace of ideas.9 In order to counteract these harms, the 
Supreme Court should overturn Martinez and allow religious 
groups to be exempt from the diversity policies of universities. 
Alternatively, state legislatures should be proactive and amend the 
diversity policies of state universities to allow student groups 
formed around the viewpoints of comprehensive religions to be 
exempt from such policies.10  
This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I sets forth two 
lines of jurisprudence relevant to the Martinez decision: (1) the 
right of groups not to associate with particular persons, and (2) the 
rules regarding limited public fora. Part I also analyzes a factually 
similar case decided before Martinez that addressed a 
nondiscrimination policy using these lines of jurisprudence. In Part 
II, this Comment examines the reasoning of the Martinez majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III argues the Martinez 
Court erred by failing to apply analogous precedents in the 
jurisprudence regarding traditional public fora, by considering 
Hastings’s policy to be viewpoint neutral, and by failing to provide 
protection for student groups with minority viewpoints. Finally, in 
Part IV, this Comment argues that religious groups are so 
important to university life that reasons of law and policy 
necessitate that either the Court or state legislatures act in order to 
preserve the existence of religious groups on college campuses. 
This Comment demonstrates that universities achieve authentic 
diversity through the protection of student religious groups. 
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE MARTINEZ REGARDING THE 
RELEVANT RIGHTS OF STUDENTS  
Associations, particularly those on college campuses, had 
enjoyed favorable treatment from the Supreme Court in the 
jurisprudence leading up to Martinez. The Court had been protective 
of the right to associate and had allowed some groups to exclude 
members with opposing viewpoints.11 Attempts by colleges to 
exclude groups, particularly religious ones, from campuses were 
constitutionally disfavored.12 With this background, the Seventh 
Circuit found that a state school’s attempt to deny recognition to a 
CLS chapter based on a nondiscrimination policy was 
                                                                                                             
 9. See infra Part IV.  
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policies” as an umbrella term to refer to both types of policies.  
 11. See infra Part I.A. 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 




unconstitutional.13 In order to determine what impact Martinez may 
have on the rights of students to form religious groups, it is 
necessary to first examine this background. 
A. The Rights of Association and Non-Association 
The Supreme Court has held that the freedom to associate has a 
“close nexus” to the freedom of speech in that effective advocacy 
of a viewpoint, including a religious one, is “undeniably enhanced 
by group association.”14 An implicit and necessary element of the 
freedom to associate is the freedom not to associate.15 This 
freedom is included in the “liberty” granted through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 
This right of “disassociation” is not absolute. In a line of cases, 
the Court has examined the right of groups to limit membership on 
the basis of sex. The seminal case in this line is Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees.17 In Roberts, a national civic organization for young men, 
the Jaycees, attempted to justify a policy limiting membership to 
males in spite of Minnesota’s Human Rights Act, which prohibited 
discriminatory practices based on sex.18 The Court upheld 
Minnesota’s act based on several factors. First, the Jaycees were a 
“large and basically unselective group.”19 Other than age and sex, 
there were no other requirements for members.20 This kind of 
broad structure lacked the “small and selective” nature the Court 
found necessary to merit constitutional protection from sexual 
discrimination prohibitions.21 Second, the Court emphasized that 
the admission of women did not appear to threaten any alteration 
of the Jaycees’ viewpoints, noting that the Jaycees had already 
allowed women to participate in many Jaycee activities.22 This 
                                                                                                             
 13. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 14. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). Thus, 
infringement upon one’s right to freely associate may also infringe upon one’s 
right to freely speak when the association is meant to promote a viewpoint. Id.  
 15. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).  
 16. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460. 
 17. This line also includes Board of Directors of Rotary International v. 
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), and New York State Club 
Association v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). See Mark Andrew Snider, 
Note, Viewpoint Discrimination by Public Universities: Student Religious 
Organizations and Violations of University Nondiscrimination Policies, 61 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 858–60 (2004).  
 18. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.  
 19. Id. at 621.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 627. 




analysis suggested that the Court was not willing to be deferential 
to a group’s self-definition and instead would examine a group to 
see if discrimination was in fact an element of a group’s 
viewpoint.23 That is, groups bore the burden of proving that 
admission of certain members would interfere with their expressive 
purposes when defending exclusionary policies.24 
The Court seemed to move away from this line of reasoning 
beginning with Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston.25 The case involved an Irish-American parade 
that, although allowing homosexuals to march in the parade, 
prevented a gay group from carrying a pro-homosexual banner.26 
The gay group sued, alleging a violation of the state public 
accommodation laws.27 Under the analysis utilized in Roberts, this 
discrimination would likely fail the test for constitutional protection, 
as such a parade is unlikely to be “small and selective,” nor does an 
Irish-American parade have an immediately apparent viewpoint that 
conflicts with homosexuality.28 However, the Court did not use the 
Roberts analysis.29 Instead, the Court allowed the group itself to 
decide whether a message promoting homosexuality was one it 
wished to express.30 This suggested a subtle shift in the Court’s 
approach. The Court deferred to the group’s stated purposes rather 
than determining objectively what messages the group actually 
expressed.31 Indeed, the Court explicitly held that the right to speech 
includes the right to control the messages broadcast by one’s 
group.32 
The Court continued to utilize the Hurley approach in Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale.33 In that case, the Boy Scouts of 
America (BSA) interpreted its values of “clean” and “morally 
straight” to require a prohibition of homosexuality and so 
dismissed a gay scoutmaster.34 The scoutmaster, like the group in 
                                                                                                             
 23. Ryan C. Visser, Note, Collision Course? Christian Legal Society v. 
Kane Could Create a Split over the Right of Religious Student Groups to 
Associate in the Face of Law School Antidiscrimination Policies, 30 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 449, 466 (2007). 
 24. Id. at 466. 
 25. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  
 26. Id. at 561.  
 27. Id. 
 28. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.  
 29. See Visser, supra note 23.  
 30. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 573–74.  
 33. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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Hurley, sued on the basis of public accommodation laws.35 The 
Court found that, despite the public accommodation laws, it would 
be unconstitutional to compel the BSA to admit the gay 
scoutmaster. The Court again deferred to the BSA’s own definition 
of its club. More importantly, the Court found that it was irrelevant 
that some members of the BSA disagreed with the BSA’s view on 
homosexuality and that some members were unaware that views 
on homosexuality were even a part of the BSA’s values.36 
These cases show considerable reluctance by the Court to 
determine whether a group’s expressed viewpoints required 
membership exclusion because forced inclusion was so 
burdensome to the exercise of the right of association.37 While 
these cases demonstrate a broadening of the Court’s allowance for 
discrimination that is generally applicable to all groups, they were 
also decided in circumstances in which the groups were acting in 
traditional public fora.38 In order to determine whether student 
groups could enjoy similar protections in the limited public forum 
of the university, this Comment now turns to the jurisprudence 
concerning the rights of groups in the university setting.  
B. The University as a Limited Public Forum 
Traditional public fora are characterized as being 
“immemorially . . . held in trust for the public” and “used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens 
and discussing public questions.”39 Either government or private 
entities can own traditional public fora.40 Examples of traditional 
public fora include parks and sidewalks.41 However, when the 
government creates a forum, the government may place some 
restrictions upon its access just as a property owner could.42 These 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. at 645. 
 36. Id. at 655–56. The Court argued BSA was free to decide to permit 
dissent within its ranks, but that the “presence of an avowed homosexual and 
gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly 
different message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who 
is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy.” Id. The Court then noted 
that BSA did claim that it would not permit any person to become a member that 
did not agree with BSA’s views on homosexuality. Id. at 655 n.1.  
 37. Visser, supra note 23.  
 38. See supra Part I.A.  
 39. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 42. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
390–91 (1993).  




fora must abide by the rules the government creates for them; that 
is, the rules must be applied consistently to all those who use or 
attempt to use the fora.43 Programs for student groups on public 
college campuses are limited public fora according to Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.44 Therefore, although universities are allowed 
to refuse recognition of student groups for legitimate reasons, this 
authority has constitutional limits. 
1. The Constitutionality of Denying Recognition to Student 
Groups on the Basis of Viewpoint 
In Healy v. James, a college president rejected the application 
of the Students for Democratic Society (SDS) because he found the 
viewpoints of the SDS conflicted with the views of the 
university.45 This was not merely a philosophical objection; the 
president was concerned that the university’s SDS would follow 
other chapters of the national SDS in promoting disruption of 
instruction and other university activities essential to the 
university’s mission to educate its students.46 Specifically, the SDS 
was found by the university to “openly repudiat[e]” the 
university’s dedication to academic freedom and its status as an 
open forum for the exchange of ideas.47 
Despite these concerns, the Court ruled it was an impermissible 
basis upon which to deny recognition to the SDS.48 The Court 
stated that, because a college campus is “peculiarly the 
marketplace of ideas,” disagreements between the university and a 
group on basic principles of education are insufficient by 
themselves to justify a denial of recognition.49 The Court also 
rejected the argument that allowing the SDS to meet off campus 
would make the university’s decision constitutionally valid.50 In 
doing so, the Court noted that a presence on campus is essential for 
any student group:  
 
                                                                                                             
 43. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
829 (1995).  
 44. Id. at 830.  
 45. 408 U.S. 169, 174–76 (1972). Although the Court framed its analysis in 
terms of the SDS’s right to associate because the SDS was an expressive 
association, the case is applicable to speech rights as well. See supra note 14 and 
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 46. Healy, 408 U.S. at 175. 
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 49. Id. at 180, 187.  
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If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus 
community in which new students enter on a regular basis, 
it must possess the means of communicating with these 
students. Moreover, the organization’s ability to participate 
in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to 
pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to 
the customary media from communicating with the 
administration, faculty members, and other students. Such 
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.51  
The Court noted that student organizations require the 
“customary media” to remain viable.52 Even though outside media 
provided means for the group’s communication, alternatives lacked 
the kind of exposure to the campus that the students required 
because the group’s viability is based “in [the] campus 
community.”53 This suggested that campus is the center of life for 
students.54 The university is a distinct place in First Amendment 
analysis. If students cannot meet on the campus, quite often they 
are unable to function as a group or to dialogue with other campus 
groups.55 Because of the unique nature of universities, the Court 
suggested that First Amendment protections may apply with 
greater force to universities than elsewhere.56 Considering the 
university’s role as a marketplace of ideas, the Court found this 
burden on student groups to be substantial.57  
The Healy Court, however, stated that it would allow the 
university to deny recognition if it could prove that the group was 
unwilling to be bound by “reasonable standards respecting 
conduct.”58 This allowance suggested a distinction between a 
university’s disagreement with a group’s conduct and 
disagreement with a group’s beliefs or philosophy. This is a 
difficult distinction to apply, as beliefs often inspire conduct and 
conduct reflects belief.59 Despite the problems this distinction may 
pose, the Court continued to expand the rights of student groups to 
receive recognition by establishing that a university may not deny 
recognition solely because a group is religious.60  
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. at 181–82. 
 52. Id.  
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 54. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3007 (2010).  
 55. Healy, 408 U.S. at 181–83.  
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2. The Constitutionality of Excluding Religious Groups Out of 
Fear of Violating the Establishment Clause  
The Court has been clear in several cases that, despite 
Establishment Clause concerns, the state may not deny access to a 
limited public forum to religious groups merely because they are 
religious.61 In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court rejected a university 
policy that denied the use of university facilities to groups wishing 
to meet for “purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”62 
The Court found that religious worship is a form of speech and is 
therefore protected by the First Amendment.63 Although this does 
allow reasonable time, place, and manner regulations (such as 
those designed to preserve scarce resources) to be applied against 
religious groups, banning religion is a content-based regulation and 
fails a strict scrutiny test.64 In a later case, the Court explained that 
allowing secular groups to speak about issues in the government 
forum while disallowing religious groups from speaking on those 
same issues in the same forum unconstitutionally disadvantages 
religious groups.65  
The Court has emphasized that this analysis does not merely 
protect the right to religious speech and association.66 Instead, the 
Court stated that the presence of religious viewpoints adds greatly 
to the marketplace of ideas that is ideal for education in general 
and universities in particular.67 In Rosenberger v. Rectors and 
                                                                                                             
 61. The “Establishment Clause” refers to the clause in the First Amendment 
prohibiting the government from making laws “respecting an establishment of 
religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The concern of these schools is that by 
providing financial and other resources to religious groups, the government is in 
effect funding religion. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270–71 
(1981). 
 62. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.  
 63. Id. at 268. 
 64. Id. at 276–77.  
 65. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
393 (1993). The case involved a group seeking the use of a classroom for the 
purpose of showing videos addressing family issues from a Christian perspective 
that was denied use of the classroom on the grounds that the school did not 
allow religious presentations. Id. at 387–89.  
 66. See infra notes 69–76.  
 67. Id. “Marketplace of ideas” refers to the theory, explicated by thinkers 
such as J.S. Mill, that by allowing all ideas to interact with each other through 
debate and critique, the weaker ideas would be rejected and the stronger ideas 
would rise to the surface. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Longmans, Green, and 
Co., eds., 4th ed. 1869). This would allow our understanding to grow as weaker 
ideas were eliminated by being exposed and compared to better ideas. See 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 




Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court addressed a 
funding restriction against religious speech.68 The university set up 
a system whereby, if a group of students qualified under certain 
criteria, the university would reimburse the group for its printing 
costs.69 However, the university refused to reimburse any costs for 
a publication that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular 
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality” out of a concern 
that such funding would violate the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.70 When one group published a Christian paper 
and the university did not reimburse it, the group filed suit.71  
In finding this refusal unconstitutional, the Court noted that 
even though content discrimination “may be permissible if it 
preserves the purposes of that limited forum . . . , viewpoint 
discrimination . . . is presumed impermissible when directed 
against speech.”72 The Court rejected the idea that funding was 
distinguishable from the access to facilities at issue in Lamb’s 
Chapel.73 Although religion is one area of inquiry, a ban of 
religious groups could be considered content discrimination as 
religion’s unique nature makes it a “specific premise, a 
perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be 
discussed and considered.”74 The Court recognized that religion 
often forms the basis of many viewpoints and perspectives.75 It 
was clear to the Court that a ban on religious speech would result 
in the “suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of 
the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and 
university campuses.”76 
In these cases, the Court took stances very favorable to 
religious student groups. The Court stated that the university is 
uniquely the marketplace of ideas; therefore, student groups would 
                                                                                                             
 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that “[t]he 
classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas’”). 
 68. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  
 69. Id. at 824–25. 
 70. Id. at 823.  
 71. Id. at 827.  
 72. Id. at 830. 
 73. Id. at 820, 832–33. 
 74. Id. at 831. 
 75. Id. The Court pointed out that the ban at issue would also prohibit the 
funding of essays by such important thinkers as Plato, Spinoza, Descartes, Karl 
Marx, Betrand Russel, and Jean-Paul Sartre had they been students. Id. at 836–
37. Almost all renowned thinkers would have their writings rejected unless they 
submitted “articles disclaiming all connection to their ultimate philosophy.” Id. 
at 837. 
 76. Id. at 836.  




be significantly burdened by not having access to the campus 
through the “customary media.”77 The Court appeared very 
interested in allowing student groups of all kinds to participate in 
the marketplace of the university and so prevented universities 
from denying recognition even out of a concern for violating the 
Establishment Clause. The constitutional bar for universities to 
deny recognition to student groups appeared to be very high.78  
C. Christian Legal Society v. Walker and the Constitutional 
Protections for Student Groups Before Martinez. 
Martinez did not mark the first time a chapter of the Christian 
Legal Society was denied recognition due to a diversity policy. 
The Southern Illinois University School of Law (SIU) had in place 
a nondiscrimination policy that listed certain bases upon which a 
campus organization could not discriminate, including sexual 
orientation and religion.79 When someone complained about CLS 
violating that policy, SIU withdrew the group’s recognition.80 This 
resulted in CLS being unable to reserve rooms for private 
meetings, to use the bulletin boards, to be shown on the school 
website, to have a faculty advisor, or to receive funds given to 
student organizations.81 As a result, CLS filed suit.82 
In reversing the district court and granting an injunction against 
SIU, the Seventh Circuit found that the university’s actions 
violated the group’s freedom of association and affected its ability 
to advocate “in a significant way.”83 For these harms to be declared 
unconstitutional, CLS had to prove three things: (1) that CLS was 
an expressive association, (2) that “the forced inclusion of active 
homosexuals [would] significantly affect CLS’s ability to express 
                                                                                                             
 77. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181–82 (1972).  
 78. Even though the Court has allowed the government to use funding to 
promote certain viewpoints, the Court has suggested that it would not allow the 
government to do so in a marketplace of ideas context, specifically the 
university. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199–200 (1991). The Court 
stated that the university “is a traditional sphere of free expression so 
fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to 
control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the 
expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth 
doctrines of the First Amendment.” Id. at 200.  
 79. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. The group could meet in classrooms on campus, but “other students 
and faculty were free to come and go from the room.” Id.   
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 861 (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 
(2000)). 




its disapproval of homosexual activity,” and (3) that CLS’s 
“interest in expressive association outweigh[ed] the university’s 
interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals.”84 The 
university’s interest could not be “related to the suppression of 
ideas” or “[achievable] through a less restrictive means.”85 
As CLS clearly expressed a Christian viewpoint, CLS met the 
first prong of being an expressive association.86 As for the second 
prong, which asks whether this forced inclusion would affect 
CLS’s ability to express its views on homosexuality, the Seventh 
Circuit stated that to “ask this question is very nearly to answer 
it.”87 The court found that it “would be difficult for CLS to 
sincerely and effectively convey a message of disapproval of 
certain types of conduct if, at the same time, it must accept 
members who engage in that conduct.”88 On the final prong of the 
test, which weighs the state’s interests against the group’s, the 
court noted that the state “has an interest in eliminating 
discriminatory conduct and providing for equal access to 
opportunities.”89 However, the only reason to force CLS to alter its 
membership policies was “to induce CLS to modify the content of 
its expression or suffer the penalty of derecognition.”90 Therefore, 
the university likely unconstitutionally withdrew its recognition of 
CLS on the basis of its nondiscrimination policy.91  
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Walker seemed to be 
supported by the majority of the jurisprudence. Courts were so 
unfavorable to universities’ attempts to enforce diversity policies 
in this context that, when religious groups pursued legal action, the 
university often capitulated and granted the religious groups an 
exception.92 Courts were highly critical of the arguments 
                                                                                                             
 84. Id. at 862 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 648–59).  
 85. Id. at 863 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 648). 
 86. Id. at 862. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 863. 
 89. Id. (citations omitted). It is important to note that while the Seventh 
Circuit found such an interest, it did not find it to be a “compelling” one. Id. at 
863 (stating only that the “state has an interest”). The Supreme Court has also 
refrained from finding the prevention of discrimination against homosexuals to 
be a compelling state interest. See Daniel R. Garner, Open Attendance—The 
First Amendment Implications of Fighting Discrimination Against Homosexuals 
in Law School Student Organizations, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1249, 1260 (2008).  
 90. Walker, 453 F.3d at 863.  
 91. Id. at 867. Walker only involved a preliminary injunction, and therefore 
the Seventh Circuit needed to only decide whether CLS was likely to win on the 
merits, not whether SIU’s policy was in fact unconstitutional. Id. at 859–60.  
 92. Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public University 
Antidiscrimination Policies and Religious Student Organizations, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2882, 2883 n.8 (2005) (citing Burton Bollag, Choosing Their Flock, 




universities were advancing in favor of diversity policies being 
used against Christian groups. Instead, the courts were more 
concerned with protection of the marketplace of ideas and the 
freedom of association. In Martinez, the Court was indifferent to 
these concerns.   
II. CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ 
A. Facts of the Case 
Hastings is a public law school in the State of California.93 For 
years, it has had a written nondiscrimination policy that, like the 
one used by SIU, names specific bases upon which groups may not 
discriminate.94 This specifically includes religion and sexual 
orientation.95 For a decade, there was a recognized Christian 
student group at Hastings.96 In 2004, the leaders of this group 
decided to affiliate with the national CLS.97 When the group 
affiliated, Hastings required it to turn in a new set of paperwork in 
order to be recognized by the school.98 The paperwork contained 
the “Statement of Faith” that all members and officers of a CLS 
organization must sign.99 This statement included an affirmation 
that Jesus Christ is the Savior, the Bible is inspired by God, and 
                                                                                                             
 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 28, 2005, at A33). Since 2000, there were at least 
50 cases in which the university capitulated after a Christian group resisted the 
university’s attempts to enforce its nondiscrimination policies. Id. There does 
not appear to be a contrary case in which a court ruled in a favor of a university 
in this context before Martinez.   
 93. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).  
 94. Id. at 2979.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 2980. 
 97. Id. at 2980. There are no indications in the opinion why the group 
decided to make the change. It is possible that affiliation with CLS would bring 
many more resources. See Law Student Resources, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY, 
http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=415 (last visited March 16, 2012). 
However, the majority does note that in the year preceding the decision to 
affiliate with CLS, a homosexual student became significantly involved with a 
Bible study the group was hosting. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990 n.19. It would 
have been interesting for the case if the group had sought affiliation in order to 
better advocate against the pro-homosexual views the group encountered in that 
Bible study or because of concern that if other practicing homosexuals joined 
the group, the group would no longer be able to advocate the views on sexual 
morality it had previously advocated.  
 98. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980.  
 99. Id. 




other tenets of the Christian faith.100 The chapter also adopted by-
laws that require members and officers to conduct their lives in 
accordance with certain principles, including abstinence from 
sexual activity outside of marriage.101 The national CLS defined 
marriage as “between a man and a woman,” meaning that a 
practicing homosexual could never live within those principles.102 
The national CLS interpreted these by-laws to exclude anyone who 
engages in “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”103  
Because of these exclusions, Hastings refused to recognize the 
CLS.104 Although Hastings would allow the CLS to use facilities 
for meetings and bulletin boards for announcements, Hastings 
informed CLS that fees could be charged for use of the rooms.105 
Hastings would not provide any funding to the group.106 Hastings’ 
decision also prevented the CLS from using the university logo and 
from participating in the Student Organizations Fair that allows 
groups to recruit new members.107 Although the CLS was able to 
put on a few activities as an independent group, it eventually 
decided that the burdens caused by the denial of recognition were 
too great and filed suit against Hastings.108 The CLS lost its case 
both at the district court and at the Ninth Circuit.109 The Supreme 
Court granted a writ of certiorari.110 
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There is one point crucial to the Martinez opinions and their 
approaches that must be explained. When both sides filed for 
summary judgment in the district court, the stipulated facts 
included a statement that Hastings’s regulations required student 
organizations to allow any students to become members and 
officers.111 Thus, CLS had to argue not against the 
nondiscrimination policy as written, but against the “all-comers” 
policy agreed to in the stipulation.112 The distinction is substantial. 
Under a nondiscrimination policy, groups could discriminate on 
bases of belief (for example, the Republican group could exclude 
Democrats); that is not the case under an “all-comers” policy.113 If 
a group denied membership to any student for any reason (other 
than the student’s qualifications, as in the case of the law review, 
for example), the denial would violate an all-comers policy.114  
What made this case particularly difficult for the Court and 
observers alike to analyze is that it does not appear that Hastings in 
fact operated under such a policy.115 Several recognized groups 
may have limited membership to those who agreed with the 
positions the group wished to advocate.116 Therefore, it is hard to 
judge exactly what student groups operating under an all-comers 
policy actually looks like. This makes comparisons between the 
situations at Hastings and other universities using 
nondiscrimination policies problematic.   
B. The Majority Opinion 
The Court held that Hastings’s “all-comers” policy was 
constitutional.117 The majority opinion, written by Justice 
Ginsburg, began the analysis by stating that the university’s 
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student group program is a limited public forum; therefore, the 
Court would review the “all-comers” policy to see if the 
restrictions were reasonable and viewpoint neutral.118 In doing so, 
the majority emphasized that Dale and Hurley had limited 
application to the present case, as both of those cases involved 
traditional public fora.119 In those cases, the groups would have 
had no choice to “opt out,” whereas CLS could function as an 
independent organization outside the forum of the university.120 
The Court summarized this difference by stating that Hastings “is 
dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of 
prohibition.”121 
The Court then proceeded to distinguish the case at hand from 
Healy by noting that Healy involved a college denying a group 
recognition explicitly because of the group’s viewpoints.122 
Similarly, the cases of Widmar and Rosenberger were 
distinguished because those, too, involved exclusions of groups 
solely because of their religious viewpoint.123 In this case, 
however, the majority stated that Hastings rejected CLS not 
because of its viewpoints, but because of its conduct—namely, the 
actions of preventing practicing homosexuals and non-Christians 
from membership.124  
Having separated itself from those precedents, the Court 
analyzed the reasonableness of the all-comers policy.125 Stating 
that the judiciary ought to give a great deal of deference to college 
administrators, the Court found that it was reasonable for the 
administrators to find that the best educational experience is 
“promoted when all participants in the forum must provide equal 
access to all students.”126 The majority found a significant fact in 
favor of that assessment was the student fees from which the 
funding would come.127 The Court found that it was reasonable to 
ensure “that no Hastings student is forced to fund a group that 
would reject her as a member.”128  
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Also troubling to the Court was the prospect of groups cloaking 
status-based discrimination in the “garb” of belief.129 The Court 
used the example of a male chauvinist club that excluded a 
woman: would the exclusion be based on her sex or her belief in 
the virtues of women?130 The majority noted this concern as 
heightened in the case of homosexuals, as previous jurisprudence 
has held that there is no distinction between discrimination against 
homosexual conduct and homosexual persons.131 
The majority was confident that a lack of recognition would 
not be troublesome to the CLS.132 Hastings did allow CLS to meet 
on campus, as opposed to the facts of Healy in which the 
university prohibited the SDS from meeting on the campus 
entirely.133 The Court also stated that “the advent of electronic 
media and social-networking sites reduces the importance of those 
channels.”134 After all, if CLS had an Internet presence, “any 
student at the school with access to Google . . . could have easily 
found it.”135 
The Court then found that the all-comers policy was 
reasonable.136 Noting that the reasonableness test is not one of 
“advisability,” the Court dismissed CLS’s objection that the “all-
comers” policy would lead to groups sabotaging one another.137 
The majority argued that students “presumably will not endeavor 
en masse to join . . . groups pursuing missions wholly at odds with 
their personal beliefs.”138  
Finally, the Court considered the question of whether an “all-
comers” policy is neutral.139 The majority thought it would be 
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“hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than one 
requiring all student groups to accept all comers.”140 The Court 
then rejected the argument that, even if the “all-comers” policy 
was neutral on its face, it would be discriminatory in application, 
as only groups with exclusionary viewpoints would be affected.141 
This argument failed because the Court found the purposes of the 
policy were unrelated to the content of expression; therefore, any 
disparate effects did not affect the policy’s neutrality.142 Having 
found that the “all-comers” policy was constitutional, the Court 
remanded the case to determine whether the policy was applied 
against CLS in a discriminatory fashion, as Hastings has only used 
the all-comers policy as the basis for denying recognition to CLS 
but had not denied recognition to other groups that may have had 
similar membership requirements.143 
C. Concurrences by Justices Stevens and Kennedy 
1. Concurrence by Justice Stevens 
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens argued that had the Court 
examined the nondiscrimination policy as written, such a policy 
would still have passed the constitutional tests.144 This was true 
because the policy was not directed at “the substance of any 
student group’s speech,” but rather the organization’s activities.145 
Only those with discriminatory conduct, not discriminatory beliefs, 
would be denied recognition.146 Stevens acknowledged that the 
policy “may end up having greater consequence for religious 
groups,” but because there was “no evidence that the policy was 
intended to cause harm to religious groups, or that it has in practice 
caused significant harm to their operations,” the policy did not 
discriminate against religion.147 
Instead, Stevens argued that the policy reflected a reasonable 
choice by the university to set the goals of its limited public 
forum.148 It was a policy determination by the university of how to 
best utilize its resources, and courts should leave such 
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determinations alone.149 Although society has to “tolerate” groups 
that discriminate, it does not have to subsidize them or “grant them 
equal access to law school facilities.”150 
2. Concurrence by Justice Kennedy 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence largely repeated arguments 
made by the majority. Where he offered different analysis was in 
his view of the function of a university’s limited public forum. He 
noted that education occurs both inside and outside the classroom 
setting and that extracurricular activities are intended to “facilitate 
interactions between students, enabling them to explore new points 
of view, to develop interests and talents, and to nurture a growing 
sense of self.”151 Particularly for law schools, the goal is to teach 
students the skills of creating “arguments in a convincing, rational, 
and respectful manner and to express doubt and disagreement in a 
professional way.”152 This comes through a “vibrant dialogue 
[that] is not possible if students wall themselves off from opposing 
points of view.”153  
Justice Kennedy seems to have argued that groups that 
associate around any particular viewpoint are frustrating the goals 
of education by closing themselves off from opposite 
viewpoints.154 This points towards a view of extracurricular groups 
as not representing different viewpoints but rather groups with 
varying viewpoints, though perhaps a common interest. An 
example of this would be a debate club that liked to meet to 
discuss issues of constitutional law, as opposed to the CLS or the 
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D. The Dissent 
Justice Alito wrote on behalf of the four justices who 
dissented.156 Justice Alito criticized the Court for dismissing a 
claim of unlawful discrimination on the basis that “the effects of 
the discrimination were really not so bad.”157 CLS had only seven 
members and was hardly flourishing.158 Even if the discrimination 
did not harm CLS significantly, discrimination cases have not 
taken the approach that “a little viewpoint discrimination is 
acceptable,” and therefore Justice Alito believed that the majority’s 
attempts to downplay the burdens CLS suffered as a result of 
Hastings’s policy were misguided.159  
Justice Alito compared the majority’s opinion to the Court’s 
decision in Healy. In Healy, the SDS suffered effects similar to 
those suffered by CLS.160 Yet, unlike the Court’s finding in 
Martinez, the Healy Court accepted the argument that, 
notwithstanding the SDS’s ability to conduct itself off campus or 
meet informally on campus, the university’s policy still constituted 
a substantial burden.161 Although the Martinez Court distinguished 
Healy on the grounds that the SDS was discriminated against 
because of its viewpoint while the CLS’s conduct was at issue in 
Martinez, Alito argued the distinction was irrelevant.162 CLS 
attempted to express its viewpoint through its membership 
requirement, and it was that viewpoint that conflicted with the 
university’s views.163  
Turning toward the line of cases holding that universities may 
not restrict speech on the basis of its religious nature, Justice Alito 
argued that the nondiscrimination policy as written would not pass 
constitutional scrutiny.164 Although Hastings allowed “political, 
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social and cultural student organizations” to restrict membership to 
those who were dedicated to the ideals or beliefs of the 
organization, Hastings did not allow religious groups to impose the 
same restrictions.165 Even though the majority attempted to 
distinguish between the beliefs and conduct of an organization, 
Justice Alito pointed out that the conduct at issue was the conduct 
of association, which “constitutes a form of expression that is 
protected by the First Amendment.”166 In this case, the line 
between conduct and belief was a false one because the beliefs 
required the conduct.167 
Justice Alito then argued for what he believed to be a more 
sensible policy. Exclusion from a group on the grounds of religion 
or belief is generally not constitutionally-protected 
discrimination.168 If religion is not relevant to a group’s expression 
or if the group is not expressive, then it is good policy to prohibit 
religion-based exclusions.169 However, religious groups are 
inherently different. Justice Alito cited a coalition of Muslim, 
Christian, Jewish, and Sikh groups in stating, “[o]f course there is a 
strong interest in prohibiting religious discrimination where 
religion is irrelevant. But it is fundamentally confused to apply a 
rule against religious discrimination to a religious association.”170 
Justice Alito hypothesized that a nondiscrimination policy, while 
preventing a religious group that believes in traditional sexual 
mores from discriminating based on sexual orientation or religion, 
would simultaneously allow a “Free Love Club” to require 
members to reject traditional sexual morality and thus discriminate 
based on viewpoint.171  
Justice Alito specifically addressed the constitutionality of the 
all-comers policy addressed by the majority.172 Because every 
limited public forum “must respect the lawful boundaries it has 
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itself set,” Justice Alito looked to the rules governing Hastings’s 
extracurricular organizations.173 Among the rules Justice Alito 
cited was a regulation that charged the Dean with “ensur[ing] an 
ongoing opportunity for the expression of a variety of 
viewpoints.”174 This had led to many different types of 
organizations, including recreational ones, common interest clubs, 
and clubs promoting a viewpoint.175 Even though Hastings 
attempted to open opportunities for leadership to all students 
through the all-comers policy, Alito believed that allowing even 
very small groups of students to form the organizations they want 
would have also allowed for growth in leadership opportunities.176 
Thus, in Justice Alito’s mind, prohibiting religious groups 
frustrated the goal of promoting leadership opportunities. 
Furthermore, Justice Alito argued that dialogue is promoted 
through groups that produce a “confident pluralism that . . . 
advances democratic consensus-building.”177 The all-comers 
policy, by limiting religious groups, prevented the very goals it 
attempted to accomplish.  
Justice Alito pointed out that religious groups that cannot agree 
to admit those who do not share their beliefs will be 
marginalized.178 In Justice Alito’s mind, this marginalization does 
not reflect the First Amendment’s commitment to robust public 
debate. Rather, it represents “a serious setback for freedom of 
expression in this country.”179 
III. THE THREE ERRORS OF THE MARTINEZ COURT AND THEIR 
EFFECT ON THE RIGHTS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 
The Court in Martinez erred in three ways. First, the Court 
erred in finding Hurley and Dale inapplicable in a limited public 
forum context. Second, even under the limited public forum 
analysis, the Hastings “all-comers” policy is not content neutral. 
Finally, the Court was wrong to ignore the harms such policies 
inflict upon student groups, particularly those organizations that 
attempt to promote a minority viewpoint.  
                                                                                                             
 173. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 3013–14.  
 176. Id. at 3014–15. 
 177. Id. at 3016 (citing Brief for Gays & Lesbians for Individual Liberty as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 35, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 
130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 530513). 
 178. Id. at 3019.  
 179. Id. at 3020.  




A. Why Hurley and Dale Ought to Have Been Applied 
The majority argued that Hurley and Dale were inapplicable to 
Martinez because those cases involved “the most traditional of 
public forums” rather than a limited public forum.180 In making 
this distinction, the Court read too much into the difference 
between public and limited public fora. When the government 
creates a limited public forum, the government “is bound by the 
same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”181 This 
means that the government can place reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations on speech only if the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest and is content 
neutral.182 While this would allow the government to place some 
restrictions on student extracurricular groups (such as budgetary 
restrictions or preventing non-students from using university 
resources), it does not follow that the university is so radically 
different from traditional fora that Hurley and Dale ought not 
apply. In fact, the Court itself has held that “the campus of a public 
university, at least for its students, possesses many of the 
characteristics of a public forum.”183 Students require access to the 
means of communication of their university in order to fully 
participate in the marketplace of ideas, just as citizens require 
access to the town square.184 An exclusion of a student group from 
a university is analogous to an exclusion of a group from a 
traditional public forum.  
Therefore, the precedents of Hurley and Dale are analogous to 
the case presented in Martinez and ought to have been applied.185 
Under this analysis, the CLS has a clearer expressive viewpoint 
that requires exclusion of gay members than either the Irish-
American parade or the BSA.186 When one considers the Court’s 
trend in Hurley and Dale of giving deference to the group’s stated 
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viewpoints, CLS’s case under a traditional public forum analysis is 
even stronger.187 With this in mind, the forced inclusion of gays 
into the group would deeply interfere with CLS’s right to associate 
via non-association, and such interference would be 
unconstitutional.188  
B. The All-Comers Policy’s Lack of Content-Neutrality 
The Court ought to have found that the all-comers policy was 
not content-neutral. The Court found that Hastings was merely 
establishing a rule of reasonable conduct. This stance does not 
recognize that for Christians, there is no practical distinction 
between promoting Christian beliefs, including those regarding 
homosexuality, and the conduct of limiting membership on the 
basis of religion and sexual orientation.  
1. Sometimes Belief Requires Conduct 
The majority argued that the all-comers policy did not promote 
a viewpoint and was viewpoint neutral because it rejected only 
CLS’s discriminatory conduct, not its beliefs.189 The policy, in the 
Court’s mind, targeted not religious or Christian groups, but all 
groups engaged in such conduct.190 Because it was so broad, the 
majority found that it would be difficult for Hastings to have 
constructed a policy that was more viewpoint neutral.191  
Supreme Court jurisprudence has held that not all conduct can 
be considered expressive speech under the First Amendment.192 
However, the Court has also held that some conduct can be 
considered so inherently expressive that the conduct is inextricably 
linked with speech and therefore is protected.193 Thus, an inquiry 
into whether a regulation is content neutral does not end when one 
determines whether the regulation targets belief or conduct. If the 
regulation targets conduct, the Court must then determine whether 
or not the conduct is indistinguishable from the beliefs such that a 
regulation against the conduct is really a regulation against the 
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beliefs.194 In the Martinez case, the inquiry is then whether CLS’s 
beliefs regarding Christianity and homosexuality required the 
conduct of exclusion of non-Christians and practicing 
homosexuals.195 
2. Exclusion Allows Religious Groups to Effectively 
Communicate Their Viewpoints  
It could be argued that the conduct of exclusion is not inherent 
in CLS’s beliefs because those with opinions different from the 
group’s beliefs could vote and perform many of the leadership 
functions of the group.  Such a member would only need to abstain 
from advocating those positions at odds with the viewpoints 
promoted by the group. Although it might be reasonable for 
Christian groups to exclude non-believers, is it necessary? 
However, the silence of dissenting members and officers carries 
with it a number of problems: (1) it hinders the intellectual growth 
of the dissenting students, (2) it hinders the ability of the group to 
promote its viewpoints to the members of the group, and (3) it 
hinders the ability of the group to advocate its positions to students 
that are not in the group.  
a. Students with Dissenting Views Do Not Prosper in Groups 
with Opposing Views 
If a student cannot voice his dissenting opinions, then there is 
very little educational growth for that student. One would be hard 
pressed to argue that teaching students through habituation to be 
silent when the majority of their peers disagree advances the 
university’s mission of teaching students to be active participants 
in their communities. If students are to have the courage to 
advance unpopular viewpoints in order to enrich the marketplace 
of ideas not only of the university but the country as well, it is bad 
policy to create an environment that encourages silence.196  
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b. Dissenting Members Negatively Affect a Group’s Ability to 
Communicate Internally 
Second, the presence of a “quiet” unorthodox believer can have 
negative effects on the group’s ability to express its viewpoints 
both internally and externally.197 Internally, studies have found that 
members of a religious group form a greater attachment to the 
religion if there is a greater amount of orthodoxy in the 
membership.198 Introducing unorthodox members would then seem 
likely to reduce the amount of attachment believing members have 
not only to the group but to the faith itself. As most religious 
groups would be trying to help believers incorporate their faith into 
a larger part of their identity, this is a serious obstacle. 
Furthermore, while an unorthodox member could perform some 
duties within a religious group, a lack of belief would prevent him 
or her from performing others. For example, a non-believer could 
not fulfill any duties regarding worship. If the meetings of the CLS 
consisted of a Bible study followed by a session of “praise and 
worship” music, a non-Christian would find it difficult, to say the 
least, to carry out those activities as well as a Christian could. This 
problem intensifies when there are acts of worship that require the 
worshipper to be a believer, such as receiving the Eucharist for 
Catholics.199 Not only would unorthodox members be unable to 
worship as devoutly as orthodox members in these cases, the 
unorthodox members would be totally unable to worship at all 
without deeply offending, if not desecrating, the religious practices 
and beliefs of the group.  
Perhaps such leaders could abstain from performing worship 
duties as well, but then one must question how many exceptions 
the group can make before the member or leader is no longer truly 
a member. The leadership opportunities that Hastings attempted to 
provide via the all-comers policy would not be present if the 
“leader” could not carry out the tasks of leadership. If there are to 
be true leadership opportunities, there cannot be castes of members 
divided upon degrees of adherence to the viewpoints of the group, 
as this would seem to cause the very problems Hastings was 
attempting to solve through the “all-comers” policy.    
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Notably this problem, at its surface, does not appear as 
prevalent when religious groups exclude practicing homosexuals 
as opposed to excluding non-believers. A practicing homosexual 
could (and many do) believe in the permissibility of homosexuality 
as well as the divinity of Jesus Christ.200 However, for many 
Christian groups, the views on homosexuality are but a small part 
of a larger set of beliefs.201 For example, the Catholic Church 
teaches that sexuality has both a unitive and procreative aspect.202 
As homosexual acts cannot ever be procreative, they are 
prohibited.203 This same principle applies to many Catholic 
teachings, including birth control, the human body, and the 
purpose of marriage.204 This is a significant range of viewpoints 
that members practicing homosexuality would be unable to 
promote, as they would have to reject the principle underlying and 
justifying the group’s viewpoints on those issues.  
Similarly, other Christian groups base their opposition to 
homosexuality on their readings of the Bible.205 A gay person 
would approach the Bible very differently from these groups, not 
only regarding those passages that specifically discuss 
homosexuality, but all other passages as well.206 With such a vast 
area in which a gay person and a traditional Christian group 
disagree, it is difficult to expect the traditional Christian group to 
incorporate the gay person as a truly full member or leader without 
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diminishing the group’s ability to express its viewpoints to the 
members of its own group.  
c. Dissenting Members Negatively Affect a Group’s Ability to 
Communicate Externally 
Finally, such a scenario would hinder the group from 
expressing its viewpoints to non-members. A group will have 
trouble persuading others about the need to change their beliefs or 
conduct when some of the group’s members have not done so. This 
difficulty is only heightened when the member is a leader of the 
group. If the leader of the Orthodox Jewish group does not keep 
kosher, why would anyone expect that group to value Jewish 
dietary restrictions? A group sends a much more powerful message 
when its members live in accordance with certain principles. 
Interestingly, Hastings recognized this as it did allow for groups to 
put in certain conduct conditions for membership into their 
bylaws.207 Very few groups want members who are unwilling to 
live up to the group’s standards of conduct, whether it is the law 
review demanding academic excellence from its members, the 
football team demanding its members devote time to practice, or a 
Christian group requiring that its members and leaders live out the 
call to Christian virtue. When members act contrary to the values 
of the group, the message of the group is diluted or lost.  
Therefore, exclusion is a necessary component for many 
religious groups at universities in order to properly convey their 
viewpoints both to their own members as well as those outside the 
group. Exclusion also prevents putting unorthodox students into 
situations where they must keep silent to retain their positions. 
Thus, the beliefs of these religious groups are inseparable from the 
conduct of exclusion.  
Because Martinez failed to recognize that beliefs require the 
conduct of exclusion, the Court has effectively created a backdoor 
for universities to exclude many religious groups from campus.208 
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What the Court sought to avoid in Widmar and Rosenberger may 
very well have been made real by Martinez. 
C. Distortion of the Marketplace by Depriving Minority Groups of 
Vital Protections 
Finally, the Court’s analysis in Martinez must be rejected 
because it changes the conception of the marketplace of ideas such 
that minority viewpoints will struggle and the marketplace itself 
will suffer as a result. The marketplace of ideas is achieved 
through having a multitude of groups representing various 
viewpoints.209 These groups help to educate members about the 
logic and reasoning behind the viewpoints of the groups, allowing 
students to better promote their viewpoints both inside and outside 
the classroom. Under this view, it is good to have both a 
Republican and a Democrat group, as these groups help their 
members develop their views so that when there is conflict, there is 
also fruitful debate and discussion. If the university funded the 
Republicans but not the Democrats, not only would the Democrats 
lack the resources to refine their arguments, but also the 
Republicans would lack the incentive to define their arguments.  
This view explains why the Court in Healy rejected the idea 
that the SDS could simply exist off campus.210 To be off campus is 
to be outside the self-contained world of the university, such that 
groups with conflicting views could ignore the SDS’s views and 
have no incentive or opportunity to grow as a result of the 
exchange of ideas.211 In short, without CLS being on campus, or 
present in the marketplace, the discussion would not happen nearly 
as effectively as it should have, if it happened at all.  
1. The Weaknesses of Diversity of Individuals Compared to 
Diversity of Groups 
Although the majority opinion is less clear about this, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence suggests that the Court’s view of what the 
marketplace of ideas on a campus ought to look like has 
changed.212 Instead of interaction by different groups representing 
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different viewpoints, the marketplace is best achieved, in Justice 
Kennedy’s view, through different students representing different 
viewpoints.213 Justice Kennedy appears to denounce the previous 
structure of viewpoint-oriented groups as allowing students to 
isolate themselves from opposing viewpoints, thereby preventing 
the marketplace from truly existing.214 Only if students associate 
with those of differing viewpoints will the university’s goals be 
truly achieved, which makes the “all-comers” policy quite 
laudable.215 This marks a radical shift in the previous uses of the 
extracurricular program forum. Instead of groups organized around 
viewpoints, groups would now likely be organized around different 
subjects or interests, becoming debate clubs or something 
similar.216 While Hastings presumably could have allowed the old 
structure to remain, it chose to alter the goals of its limited forum 
to produce this kind of marketplace.217 
Even if these changes are really enacted with the goal of 
maximizing the marketplace, the opposite result is sure to occur. It 
is important to interact with people of different viewpoints, but 
students already do this in the classroom setting, where peers of 
many viewpoints discuss the issues of the class. Extracurricular 
organizations are supposed to supplement the curriculum by 
providing what is not possible in the classroom.218 It is true that 
extracurricular activities under an “all-comers” policy would 
provide a more intimate environment for discussing issues than the 
classroom and thus would probably encourage students to express 
their viewpoints. However, the dynamics of the discussion would 
be identical to that of the classroom and so would not provide a 
significant supplement for the university.  
In contrast, groups rallied around a viewpoint enrich the 
marketplace in ways that organizations under an “all-comers” 
policy cannot. Students with a minority viewpoint can find comfort 
in associating with others who share their viewpoint, allowing 
them to feel more confident in their views and thus better able to 
promote their viewpoints in the various settings of the 
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university.219 Indeed, Americans traditionally form groups when 
they wish to promote a viewpoint.220 Moreover, groups promoting 
a minority viewpoint help make other students aware of the 
viewpoint. Just by existing, a group calls attention to its viewpoint 
and grants it a kind of legitimacy that a student acting as an 
individual could not achieve. Finally, groups rallied around a 
viewpoint are more interested in their viewpoint being presented 
well. Often, groups will host events designed to help students 
formulate and articulate their arguments and more fully understand 
the issue.221 This in turn allows the student to learn the skills of 
advocacy and be a better participant both on group issues and other 
issues. Thus, these groups provide strong value to the educational 
mission of all universities and law schools in particular.   
2. The Survival of Groups with Minority Viewpoints Under an 
All-Comers Policy 
Even if the “all-comers” policy is not so radical and viewpoint-
based groups continue, minority groups will still be greatly 
hindered from forming. Although the Court dismisses the prospect 
of students with opposing viewpoints joining groups, this is a 
rather naïve view of the maturity of college-aged students that 
places minority groups at significant risk. Majority groups may 
have a desire to prevent minority groups from preaching against 
the views of the majority, and taking over the minority group is an 
excellent method to achieve that objective. 
It should be emphasized that this is not an implausible 
hypothetical; in fact, takeovers have already occurred on college 
campuses with “all-comers” policies.222 For example, at the 
University of Nebraska, the College Republicans attended the 
elections of the Young Democrats.223 Being in the majority, the 
College Republicans elected members of the College Republicans 
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as officers in the Young Democrats.224 At Central Michigan 
University, students who believed the Young Americans for 
Freedom (YAF) promoted hateful viewpoints began a group on 
Facebook.com that called for students to go to the YAF elections 
and elect anti-YAF students as officers.225 Various students 
attended YAF meetings and disrupted the meetings.226 Before the 
elections were held, Central Michigan University decided to 
change its policy.227 These examples show that the minority groups 
need the ability to limit membership to those who share their 
viewpoints in order to protect against the very real threat of being 
taken over by students of the majority viewpoint. 
Ironically, homosexuals, as a minority group, have enjoyed 
great benefits from excluding others based on sexual orientation. 
Some homosexual groups in the early 1900s feared being revealed 
as gay if non-gays were admitted and so limited membership to 
only homosexuals.228 This exclusion applied to bisexuals as 
well.229 As the gay rights movement progressed, homosexual 
groups relied heavily on the freedom of association in order to 
protect their rights to meet at universities, particularly the freedom 
espoused in Rosenberger.230 Without these rights, the movement 
for gay equality may not have enjoyed the increased “public 
visibility” that has helped its viewpoint gain popularity.231 Had 
homosexual groups at universities been denied the ability to 
exclude, the groups may not have formed at all because of fear of 
retribution by the majority. This demonstrates just how important 
the ability to exclude can be for a group espousing a minority 
viewpoint.  
However, even if the Court is right in stating that most people 
would not be interested in joining groups that advocate viewpoints 
other than their own, then the question of what these policies 
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accomplish arises. If no one who believes in the acceptability of 
homosexuality is interested in joining a traditional Christian group, 
why would universities be inclined to ban traditional Christian 
groups because they refuse to admit those who will not join? Such 
a ruling not only seems petty, but it also seems to distort the values 
of real diversity.232  
Regardless of the form an “all-comers” policy takes, the 
marketplace of ideas that once existed in the university will 
diminish considerably. As the Court has time and time again 
sought to protect this nature of education through constitutional 
analysis, it is disgraceful that the Court allowed a university to 
distort its extracurricular forum as Hastings did.  
D. Would a Nondiscrimination Policy as Applied Against Religious 
Groups be Constitutional under Martinez?  
The national CLS has argued that Walker, which focuses on the 
constitutionality of nondiscrimination policies, continues to be 
good law.233 It is an issue, then, whether the reasoning of Martinez 
can be applied to only those institutions with an all-comers policy, 
or if Martinez changed the analysis such that even schools with a 
nondiscrimination policy would be affected.234 In order to 
determine just how much impact Martinez will have on the free 
speech rights of university students, it must be determined whether 
Martinez has left Walker largely untouched.  
Walker had three prongs in its analysis of determining whether 
CLS’s ability to advocate was harmed in a significant way.235 The 
first prong, whether the group is expressive, is not altered by the 
Martinez decision, as the majority in Martinez found CLS to be 
expressive as well.236 The second prong asked whether or not 
admitting homosexuals would affect the CLS’s ability to advocate 
against homosexuality.237 While the Seventh Circuit thought that to 
“ask the question is very nearly to answer it,” the Supreme Court 
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disagreed.238 In Martinez, the Court assumed it was possible for the 
CLS to admit dissenters as members while proclaiming its 
message.239 On the third prong, weighing the interest of the group 
against the interest of the university, the Walker court held that 
although the university has an interest in protecting homosexuals 
from discrimination, this interest is related to the suppression of 
viewpoints and therefore impermissible.240 However, this seems to 
rest upon the assumption that by forcing groups with viewpoints 
against homosexuality to admit homosexuals, the university is 
engaging in viewpoint discrimination, i.e., is not being viewpoint 
neutral. The Court in Martinez rejected this reasoning.241 
To be sure, the Martinez Court was impressed that the all-
comers policy applied to any kind of belief and so was easily 
viewpoint and content neutral.242 A nondiscrimination policy 
would not have the same advantage, as it applies only to certain 
areas of discrimination, while an all-comers policy prohibits 
discrimination on any basis.243 Although the majority opinion does 
not address what it would have said about nondiscrimination 
policies, Justice Stevens argued that they would also be viewpoint 
neutral because they would apply to all groups seeking to 
discriminate.244 On the other hand, Justice Alito argued that due to 
the discriminatory motive he believed Hastings to have exhibited 
in denying recognition only to the CLS and due to the 
disproportionate impact on religious groups, a nondiscrimination 
policy would be unconstitutional.245  
Although it is a difficult task to predict what the Supreme 
Court would do, it is also difficult to imagine that the Court would 
find a nondiscrimination policy anything but viewpoint-neutral 
under Martinez’s reasoning. If acceptance of homosexuality was 
not a viewpoint when Hastings expressed it through the “all-
comers” policy, it seems unlikely that its expression in a narrow 
nondiscrimination policy would make it a viewpoint.246 
Additionally, the disparate impact on religious groups did not 
affect the Court’s judgment in Martinez and so would not likely 
persuade the Court that a nondiscrimination policy is not viewpoint 
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neutral.247 Most importantly, much of the negative consequences of 
being banned from campus, including the lack of access to the 
normal channels of communication, were minimized in Martinez, 
so that groups will face the difficult if not impossible task of 
showing that they have been burdened significantly when the 
university denied their use of campus facilities.248  
Although the Court in Martinez was concerned about whether 
Hastings seemingly selected out the CLS for enforcement, if a 
college does enforce a nondiscrimination policy against all groups 
equally, the policy is likely to stand.249 Thus, even at campuses 
without an “all-comers” policy, religious groups are likely to be 
left without constitutional protection from diversity policies if the 
Court continues to use the reasoning employed in Martinez.  
IV. WHY RELIGIOUS GROUPS SHOULD BE GRANTED AN EXEMPTION 
FROM UNIVERSITIES’ DIVERSITY POLICIES  
Because the beliefs of religious groups often require exclusion 
of those with opposing beliefs, many religious groups will be 
unable in good conscience to comply with diversity policies.250 In 
order to prevent universities from losing the diversity these 
religious groups contribute, the Court ought to overturn Martinez 
and grant religious groups an exemption from diversity policies. 
However, because this seems unlikely in the short term, state 
legislatures and other organizations in charge of setting diversity 
policies for state universities must create exemptions for groups 
who promote the beliefs of a comprehensive religion.  
A. The Value of Comprehensive Religions to Universities 
Even in secular universities, religion can greatly assist in the 
interaction and communication between disciplines. Although the 
definition of religion is difficult to determine for theologians and 
lawyers alike, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to 
synthesize Supreme Court jurisprudence to come up with a three 
part-definition.251 The three parts are: (1) if the alleged religion 
considers “ultimate” questions such as life and death or good and 
evil; (2) if the religion is a comprehensive belief system; and (3) if 
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the religion has the “defining structural characteristics of a 
traditional religion, such as ‘ceremonial functions, the existence of 
clergy, [and so forth].’”252 The Supreme Court has been clear that 
this does not protect purely secular beliefs, i.e., those that are 
“philosophical and personal.”253 
Although there are some disagreements about this definition’s 
appropriateness, the second prong is particularly important.254 
Religion can be “comprehensive,” which by definition means the 
religious faith affects every aspect of the adherent’s life.255 There 
is nothing that a believer could do in which religion would not 
provide guidance or influence.256 In fact, many faiths require their 
followers to integrate their beliefs into every aspect of their 
lives.257  
The pervasiveness of religious faith in the lives of believers has 
previously led to conflict with governmental policies. In these 
situations, an exception for religious expression is not a new 
concept; schools have employed this exception before in the area 
of uniform regulations.258 Although this can sometimes create 
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difficulties as students attempt to justify fashion preferences as 
religious expression, it establishes that courts are willing to 
undertake such difficult inquiries in order to protect the First 
Amendment rights of the speaker.259  
When religion is comprehensive, it has a particular value to the 
university that non-comprehensive viewpoints lack.260 The modern 
university is anything but universal; often disciplines conduct 
themselves in isolation from each other.261 Although this increases 
the efficiency of research, it prevents a true understanding of 
reality in which disciplines are not artificially separated as they are 
in a university. What has resulted is “a place in which certain 
questions go unasked or rather, if they are asked, it is only by 
individuals and in settings such that as few people as possible hear 
them being asked.”262 With so much disunity, the need for 
comprehensive belief systems cannot be understated.  
Religions bring disciplines into dialogue with each other that 
would otherwise not interact in the modern university. For 
example, in the mind of a religious person, ethics has considerable 
relation to science; law has considerable relation to sociology in 
order to care for the poor.263 Even though some philosophies could 
theoretically bring various subjects together, they are not 
comprehensive like religion and therefore cannot unite disciplines 
the same way religion can.264 The presence of religion on a campus 
best enables a university or any other educational body to bring 
together various disciplines. Thus, religion’s comprehensive nature 
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aids the university greatly in its mission of educating its students 
about the world as a whole. Therefore, universities must operate 
under diversity policies that contain exemptions for religious 
groups in order to best fulfill their charge of educating students.  
B. The Need for Well-Formed Religious Viewpoints in the 
Marketplace of Ideas 
Another important mission of education is to expose students 
to a wide variety of ideas as the university is uniquely the 
“marketplace of ideas.”265 It is hard to imagine a thriving 
marketplace in the United States that does not have religious 
viewpoints well represented.266 Not only do many people 
pronounce religious beliefs, but comprehensive religions, by their 
definition, proclaim ideas on almost every subject. If it is essential 
for the university and its students to grow in knowledge and 
approach truth by having as many ideas as possible interact with 
each other, it is also essential for religion to be well represented in 
the university. 
For example, a discussion in a constitutional law class about 
Griswold v. Connecticut requires a student to determine why the 
Court believed an individual’s interest in privacy and autonomy 
outweighed the state’s desire to ban contraceptive use.267 This 
discussion will be rather dull if everyone accepts that laws against 
contraception are silly and that use of contraception presents no 
moral problems. However, if there is someone from a Catholic 
viewpoint who is well-versed in Catholic teaching (or any other 
religion that prohibits use of contraception), a purely academic 
discussion changes to an actual conflict of competing values. Such 
a discussion represents more closely the debate that the 
Connecticut Legislature and the Supreme Court addressed.268 
Exposure to such discussions would greatly increase a student’s 
understanding of the decision. 
The need for exposure to religion is particularly true of those 
religions that are not merely unpopular, but largely unknown by 
the general American public. For example, an understanding of the 
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differences and disputes between Sunni and Shia sects within 
Islam would be vital in a class dealing with issues of the Middle 
East.269 Another example would be an understanding of the Sikh 
traditions that mandate that Sikhs must always wrap their hair and 
wear a small curved sword.270 This may enrich a discussion about 
the appropriateness of government regulations on uniforms in 
schools or in the military.271 Allowing the formation of groups that 
promote the viewpoints of those religions that are not familiar to 
many Americans would give students a much greater opportunity 
to learn about these faiths that play important roles in policy 
decisions both home and abroad.272  
Religion is important even in topics that do not directly 
concern religion. Religion has played such a tremendous role in 
philosophy, science, and law that it is impossible to imagine a 
useful education that does not effectively address religion.273 Much 
of the legal and philosophical precepts used by the modern 
Western world came to it through religion.274 Without an 
understanding of religion, much of the terms used in the modern 
world lack context and would be only fragments detached from the 
source of their significance.275 If a university is to promote 
understanding, religion is indispensable. This understanding is not 
limited to only religious ideas, but includes religious (and non-
religious) persons themselves.276 By growing in understanding 
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both of religious persons and religious ideas, the student is not only 
better equipped to act within a democratic environment that 
requires an actor to interact with religion, but the student also has 
more information from which to choose her own ideas, thus 
making her more autonomous.277 By limiting the ability of 
religious groups to express their viewpoints, universities are 
diminishing the opportunities of their students to gain the valuable 
education that comes from religious groups robustly promoting 
their ideas.  
It is true that because the definition of religion is nebulous, 
some groups may be able to clothe hate speech under religious 
garb, even under a comprehensiveness requirement. Indeed, many 
totalitarian ideologies, such as fascism and Nazism, appropriated 
religious guises to further their causes.278 However, under 
marketplace principles, it is better to let these groups out in the 
open than remain hidden. If a university has a sizable minority of 
racists, it is better to spend the minimal costs of recognition so that 
the group is out in the open where their racist or otherwise 
deplorable views can be defeated (and ideally their minds changed) 
than to allow the students to graduate with their erroneous views 
intact. Not only will the university have failed to provide students 
with a proper education, but it also will have to suffer the 
consequences of alumni representing the university very poorly.  
An on-campus group thus greatly increases the expression of 
religious ideas, and it is better to have these ideas than not. In fact 
the Court has held that diversity is valuable for both students and 
society.279 Diversity promotes virtues of tolerance and respect for 
those with differing viewpoints and also helps students gain a 
greater sense of autonomy as they define themselves through 
interactions with those of a different perspective.280 This applies to 
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religious diversity as much, if not more, as it applies to racial or 
sexual diversity.281 
Therefore, if universities are going to achieve the benefits of 
diversity, universities must secure religious diversity. Because the 
presence of religious groups greatly aids in allowing a multitude of 
religious perspectives to be promoted in the university, it is 
essential that universities secure the existence of religious student 
groups by exempting religious groups from diversity policies. 
Ironically, the only way to preserve true diversity is to exempt 
religious groups from a diversity policy.  
CONCLUSION 
A world of diversity and education is not achieved when 
religious groups are excluded from the table. Members of different 
religious beliefs must learn how to properly dialogue with one 
another. The Martinez opinion prevents that from happening and 
so marks a step backwards for students who seek truth. To counter 
this effect, the Court or state legislatures should act positively to 
create exceptions in diversity policies for religious groups.  
It has been said that “[f]aith and reason are like two wings on 
which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth.”282 With 
religious groups on campus, believers and non-believers alike have 
their educational experiences deeply enriched. In a misguided 
attempt to either protect homosexuals from discrimination or to 
create a truly secular education, universities, with the constitutional 
blessing of the Martinez court, have clipped one of these wings 
from their students. Education has suffered a grievous loss, but if 
exemptions to diversity policies are granted to religious groups, 
students can regain their wings and resume their ascent in truth and 
learning.   
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